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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Whose woods these are I think I know. 
His house is in the village though; 
He will not see me stopping here 
To watch his woods fill up with snow. 
 
My little horse must think it queer 
To stop without a farmhouse near 
Between the woods and frozen lake 
The darkest evening of the year. 
 
He gives his harness bells a shake 
To ask if there is some mistake. 
The only other sound’s the sweep 
Of easy wind and downy flake. 
 
The woods are lovely, dark and deep. 
But I have promises to keep, 
And miles to go before I sleep, 
And miles to go before I sleep.1 
 
What would have happened if the horseman, instead of keeping his promises, had 
decided to stay in the woods?  Perhaps the story would have gone as follows.  First 
he built a fire to warm up.  He then went ice fishing on the frozen lake, cooked his 
fish on his fire, and took a nap.  Eventually, he built a cabin and collected firewood 
for the cold nights.  He also found some oats nearby, so he was able to feed his horse 
during the long winter.   
As the lake began to thaw and leaves began to adorn the naked trees, the 
horseman realized how truly magnificent really were the woods.  He knew he could 
never leave.  So, he stayed through the spring and summer and, as autumn gave way 
to winter, he was reminded of what drew him to these woods in the first place, the 
serenity of the woods in winter. 
And the cycle continued the next year, and the year after that.  Eventually, the 
horseman grew old; he had been in the woods for close to fifty years.  No one had 
missed him other than one nephew who owned a lumber company and who 
occasionally visited him and made sure he was alive.  Realizing that his health was 
failing, the horseman wrote a will, in which he bequeathed his horse and his woods 
to his dear nephew.  A short time later, the horseman died.  On his next trip to the see 
his old uncle, the nephew found the horseman resting peacefully on a tree stump, his 
body slumped on the remains of a tree he had cut down to build his cabin. 
By this time, the true owner’s children had buried their father.  When they read 
his will, they learned that he had left them the entire forest.  To their utter 
                                                                
1Robert Frost, Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening, 
http://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/poetry/poems/stoppingByTheWoods.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/8
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astonishment, when they came to survey their inheritance, they observed the 
horseman’s nephew bringing in bulldozers. 
But how should the story end?  Who should be entitled to keep the property?  
How should this dispute be resolved?  Under the American law of adverse 
possession, the horseman’s nephew will likely be rewarded for his uncle’s decision 
to remain in the forest.  Rather than keeping his promises and traveling all those 
miles before he slept, the horseman instead acquired property that he was able to 
leave to his nephew. 
This article questions the current doctrine of adverse possession, which would 
deprive the true owner’s children of their inheritance in favor of the horseman’s 
nephew.2  Today, all states recognize that when a possessor satisfies the elements of 
adverse possession, he assumes ownership of the property.3  Currently, adverse 
possession serves as a mechanism through which property ownership magically 
transfers from the true owner to the adverse possessor.4  By simply satisfying the 
elements of adverse possession, the possessor becomes the owner of the property in 
place of the true owner.5 
Rather than viewing adverse possession as a method of acquiring land, adverse 
possession should instead create a rebuttable presumption of ownership.  The idea 
that adverse possession should create a rebuttable presumption stems from the Judaic 
law doctrine of chazakah.6  To explain why chazakah is preferable to the current 
adverse possession doctrine, this article explains what chazakah is, addresses the 
major justifications and criticisms of adverse possession, and proposes a shift in 
adverse possession that would resemble chazakah.  Adopting a method similar to 
chazakah would protect the integrity of adverse possession’s justifications while 
alleviating its strongest criticisms. 
Section II of this article describes adverse possession and outlines its elements.  
Not all states recognize the same elements for adverse possession, but a number of 
elements are common to all states.7  This section, in describing how the doctrine 
                                                                
2This article considers only adverse possession’s application to real property, not to 
personal property.  For a discussion of how adverse possession applies to personal property, 
see Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119 
(1989).  See also O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980) (holding that in cases of 
personal property, a discovery rule should replace adverse possession; “the inquiry will no 
longer be whether the possessor has met the tests of adverse possession, but whether the owner 
has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal property.”). 
3Thomas J. Miceli, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 
161 (1995). 
4Throughout this article, chazakah will be addressed as a type of adverse possession.  
Therefore, whether discussing adverse possession or chazakah, the “adverse possessor” is the 
person attempting to acquire the property, and the true owner is the titleholder, the party 
seeking to retain ownership, rather than lose his property to the adverse possessor. 
5See Lawrence v. Town of Concord, 788 N.E.2d 546, 551 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
meeting the elements of adverse possession confers title on the adverse possessor). 
6Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah). 
7For example, all states agree that the adverse possessor must display actual possession 
and that his possession must be hostile to the true owner’s claim of ownership.  See, e.g., 
Rutland v. Mullen, 798 A.2d 1104, 1110 (Me. 2002) (requiring actual and hostile possession 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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works, provides a framework for discussing how and why the law should change.  
Though the adverse possessor must meet a high burden to successfully assume 
ownership in property, once he has met that burden, he becomes the owner.8  His 
ownership rests completely on his own actions, not at all on the actions of the true 
owner.9  To obtain ownership, the adverse possessor is not required to pay the true 
owner for the land or even to claim that he ever did pay for the property.  Simply 
satisfying adverse possession’s elements confers ownership on the adverse 
possessor.10 
Section III of this article describes chazakah.  This section explains what 
chazakah is and more importantly what it is not.  Unlike adverse possession, 
chazakah serves not as a tool by which a person acquires land, but instead creates a 
presumption of ownership.11  The true owner, however, may rebut that 
presumption.12  Chazakah evidences a transaction and nothing more.  It is not, by 
itself, a method of obtaining ownership in property.  Simply proving the elements of 
chazakah will not result in ownership vesting in the adverse possessor.13 
A close look at chazakah indicates that while chazakah and adverse possession 
share a number of similarities, there is a fundamental difference between them.  That 
difference underscores two entirely different mechanisms for land transfer.  Section 
III concludes with an illustration of the difference between the doctrines by applying 
the facts from Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom,14 to both adverse possession and chazakah. 
Sections IV and V respectively discuss the major justifications for and criticisms 
of adverse possession.  Section VI explains how chazakah not only satisfies adverse 
possession’s justifications but also escapes its criticisms, and explains why it is 
therefore a suitable alternative to adverse possession. 
                                                          
as elements of adverse possession); Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2001) (including 
actual and hostile possession as elements of adverse possession); City of Deadwood v. 
Summit, Inc., 607 N.W.2d 22, 27 (S.D. 2000) (“The traditional elements of adverse possession 
require the ‘actual . . . and hostile’ occupation of the property for the statutory period.”); 
Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 305 (Wyo. 1999) (“To establish adverse possession, the 
claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of 
another’s property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.”); Rice v. 
McGinnis, 653 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1995) (requiring actual and hostile possession as elements of 
adverse possession). 
8The high burden the adverse possessor faces manifests itself in the number of elements he 
must prove and, in most states, the burden of proof with which he must prove them. 
9The adverse possessor’s ownership does, however, rely on the true owner’s failure to act. 
10See Gruebele v. Geringer, 640 N.W.2d 454, 457 (N.D. 2002) (noting that failure to meet 
any element of adverse possession results in the title not being conferred; by implication, 
meeting all the elements of adverse possession results in title being conferred).  
11See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). 
12See id. 
13Id. 
14799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/8
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II.  ADVERSE POSSESSION 
A.  Elements:  Generally 
To acquire land through adverse possession, a possessor must prove a minimum 
of five elements, though some states require additional elements as part of an adverse 
possession claim.15  The basic elements are described as follows: 
First, the possession must be actual.  There must be physical control and 
use of the disputed property for the statutory period.  Second, the 
possession of the disputed tract must be hostile to other competing claims 
to the property.  Third, that possession must be open and notorious, such 
that those individuals having competing claims to the property actually 
know or should have known of that possession.  Fourth, possession must 
be exclusive, such that others with competing claims to the property are 
wholly excluded from the property.  Lastly, the possession must be 
continuous . . . .16 
B.  Additional Elements 
Some states require adverse possessors to prove elements in addition to the five 
listed above.  These other elements include the adverse possessor paying property 
taxes on the land,17 possessing the land “under color of title,”18 and occupying the 
                                                                
15Compare Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920) (requiring only the basic 
five elements to prove an adverse possession claim), with Bradley v. Demos, 599 So.2d 1148, 
1149 (Ala. 1992) (requiring, in a case of statutory adverse possession, “that the [adverse] 
possessor hold [the property] under color of title, have paid taxes on the property for ten years, 
or have derived his title by descent or devise” and hold the property under claim of right, in 
addition to “the common elements of actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile 
possession”). 
16Rodgers v. Thelkald, 80 S.W.3d 532, 534-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (emphases added) 
(citations omitted).  See also Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 N.W.2d 744, 746 (S.D. 2001) (holding 
that parties “claiming ownership to land through adverse possession must show that their 
possession was actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile”); Hoffman v. 
Freeman Land & Timber, LLC, 994 P.2d 106, 109 (Or. 1999) (holding that a successful 
adverse possession claim requires the purported adverse possessor to establish that the use of 
the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile); Grace v. Koch, 
692 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ohio 1998) (adopting only the basic five elements as the test for 
adverse possession, noting specifically that “to acquire title by adverse possession, a party 
must prove . . . exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use . . . .”). 
17See Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 595 (1883) (requiring the payment of taxes as an 
element of adverse possession).  See also Tidwell v. Strickler, 457 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala. 1984) 
(holding that for statutory adverse possession, as opposed to adverse possession by 
prescription, an adverse possessor must have paid taxes for at least ten years to successfully 
litigate the claim); McKinnon v. Commerford, 88 So.2d 753 at 755 (Fla. 1956) (requiring, for 
all adverse possession claims that ripened after 1939, adverse possessors to have paid taxes 
from within one year after entry onto the disputed property to satisfy the elements of adverse 
possession). 
18See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas & Sparks Realty Co., 166 P. 285, 286 (Ariz. 1917) 
(recognizing color of title as an element of adverse possession).  See also Peters v. Smuggler-
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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land in “good faith”19 or “under a claim of right.”20  These additional elements make 
acquiring land through adverse possession more difficult; they do not, however, 
change the nature of the doctrine.  In addition to the elements, every state has 
adopted a statute of limitations for adverse possession.  These vary from state to 
state, but range from five21 to thirty years for typical cases of adverse possession.22 
C.  Burden of Proof 
Though the general rule for the burden of proof in civil cases is proof by a 
preponderance of evidence,23 most states have adopted a more stringent rule in 
adverse possession cases.24  In Grace v. Koch, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court 
accepted the clear and convincing evidence standard as the burden of proof on the 
adverse possessor.25  The higher standard allocates the risk of mistakenly depriving 
                                                          
Durant Mining Corp., 930 P.2d 575, 579 (Colo. 1997) (requiring adverse possessors to prove 
color of title, but viewing the “color of title and tax payment requirements . . . in an 
interchangeable manner”).  But see O’Neal v. Ellison, 587 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ark. 1979) 
(“Color of title is not an essential element to a claim of adverse possession if there is actual 
possession . . . .”); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 594 P.2d 128, 132 n.3 (Haw. 1979) (“[S]howing color 
of title . . . is unnecessary in proving adverse possession so long as the other necessary 
elements are present . . . .”). 
19See Erwin v. Miller, 45 S.E.2d 192, 194 (Ga. 1947) (recognizing good faith as an 
element of adverse possession); Kaneville v. Meredith, 184 N.E. 883, 885 (Ill. 1933) 
(requiring an adverse possessor to have possessed the disputed property in good faith for the 
statutory period of time to prove adverse possession).  See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123-24 (1984) 
(arguing that in all states, judges and juries manipulate the elements of adverse possession to 
include a good faith requirement). 
20See Schulz v. Syvertsen, 591 A.2d 804, 810 n.8 (Conn. 1991) (holding that an essential 
element of adverse possession is the adverse possessor holding the disputed property under a 
claim of right); Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 52 (Colo. 1989) (holding that “one claiming 
title by adverse possession must prove that his possession of the disputed parcel was actual, 
adverse, hostile, under claim of right, exclusive and uninterrupted for” eighteen years). 
21See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 325 (West 1982). 
22See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3486 (West 1994) (adverse possession of real property 
requires thirty years without the need for just title or occupation in good faith).  But see ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-523 (West 1992) (in some circumstances as few as three years may be 
sufficient); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West 1995) (for woodlands, an adverse possessor 
must satisfy a 60 year statute of limitations).  Most states’ statutes of limitation range from 
between ten and twenty years.  See William G. Ackerman, Outlaws of the Past: A Western 
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 111-12 
(1996). 
23See, e.g., Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Intern. Corp., 333 N.E.2d 50, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975). 
24See Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 494 (W.Va. 1996). 
25Grace, 692 N.E.2d at 1012.  See also Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494 (accepting clear and 
convincing evidence as the requisite burden of proof while recognizing that a minority 
approach allows title to be transferred when the adverse possessor shows a mere 
preponderance of the evidence).  See also Hoffman, 994 P.2d at 109. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/8
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the true owner of his property against the adverse possessor in favor of the true 
owner.26  The Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Brown v. Gobble, explained as 
follows: 
The interest at stake in an adverse possession claim is not the mere loss of 
money as is the case in the normal civil proceedings.  Rather, it often 
involves the loss of a homestead, a family farm or other property 
associated with traditional family and societal values. . . . Adopting the 
clear and convincing standard of proof is more than a mere academic 
exercise.  At a minimum, it reflects the value society places on the rights 
and interests being asserted.27 
Though some states do allow a less stringent burden of proof,28 the majority of states 
favors the higher burden of proof. 
The current doctrine of adverse possession and its interpretation and application 
in contemporary courts indicates the premium that society places on protecting 
property ownership.  That value is reflected not only in the elements required to 
sustain a claim for adverse possession, but also with the oft insisted upon element of 
the adverse possessor acting in good faith.29  The states that have adopted the higher 
burden of proof have likewise furthered the goal of ensuring that property owners do 
not incorrectly lose their property.30  Nonetheless, even with all the safeguards built 
into adverse possession, there is still a significant possibility that an innocent true 
owner will unfairly lose his property to a trespasser.  Chazakah provides a solution 
that helps alleviate some of the problems inherent to adverse possession. 
                                                          
Preponderance of the evidence has been described as a fifty-one percent margin in favor of 
the party that has the burden of proof.  See Coleman v. Anne Arundel Co. Police Dept., 797 
A.2d 770, 781 (Md. 2002).  Stated another way, the preponderance of evidence standard 
means that something is more likely than not correct.  See Kahn v. East Side Union High 
School Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 37 (Cal. 2003). 
“[C]lear and convincing evidence requires more than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence, but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt or undisputed evidence.”  
Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 672 N.W.2d 668, 672 (N.D. 2003).  See also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Smith, 829 A.2d 567, 583 (Md. 2003) (holding that to 
prove evidence by the “clear and convincing” standard, one must prove more than a 
preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Berczyk v. 
Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (D. Minn. 2003). 
26See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494. 
27Id. 
28See Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701, 702-03 (Colo. 1989) (holding preponderance of 
evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is the standard of proof for adverse possession).  
29See Merrill, supra note 19, at 1123. 
30See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494.  Additionally, even those states that reject the clear and 
convincing standard might do so because of state constitutional constraints.  See, e.g., Gerner, 
768 P.2d at 702 (indicating that the court’s insistence on the preponderance of evidence 
standard rather than the clear and convincing standard results from the state constitution’s 
requirement that all civil actions carry the same burden of proof). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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III.  CHAZAKAH 
On its surface, chazakah appears to be very similar to adverse possession.  In 
fact, other than chazakah always requiring a mere three-year statute of limitations, 
the doctrines appear to be identical.  Nonetheless, a deeper investigation reveals that 
they are, in fact, very different.  Whereas adverse possession is a mechanism of land 
transfer, chazakah is not.  First, chazakah is only permissibly raised in support of a 
claim of true ownership.31  Second, even if the adverse possessor successfully proves 
all of the elements of chazakah, chazakah only results in a presumption of 
ownership; it does not effectuate a land transfer by itself.32  Chazakah appears in the 
Mishnah and Talmud in Tractate Bava Basra.33  Maimonides explains the Mishnaic 
and Talmudic texts and formulates chazakah as black letter law.34  Maimonides 
discusses chazakah in his compilation of Judaic law called Mishnah Torah.35  As the 
Mishnah, the Talmud, and Maimonides make clear, although they share many 
similarities, adverse possession and chazakah are really two fundamentally different 
doctrines. 
A.  Elements: Generally 
Judaic law recognizes chazakah as a mechanism through which one can assert 
ownership to property.36  Though not explicitly mentioned in the Bible, the Mishnah 
and Talmud derive chazakah from the verse in Deuteronomy that states, “you shall 
possess [the land] and you shall settle in it.”37  The Talmud interprets this verse to 
                                                                
31Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).  See also Bava Basra 28B (Talmud) (asserting that a 
chazakah without an additional claim of ownership is not a valid legal argument). 
32See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah); MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Toen V’Nitan, 
11:1, 14:12 [hereinafter Toen V’Nitan]. 
33The Mishnah and the Talmud represent portions of Judaism’s oral law.  There is no real 
American law equivalent in the type of work that they represent.  Tractates are volumes of 
Judaic law focusing primarily on one area of law.  Tractate Bava Basra deals with property 
transfers.  The third chapter of Tractate Bava Basra discusses chazakah and how it applies to 
real estate.  The citations to these works will often refer to scholars who explain the Mishnaic 
and Talmudic texts.  Many of those scholars’ writings do not appear in separate books, but are 
rather incorporated into the pages of the Mishnah and the Talmud.  When studying Mishnah 
and Talmud, these explanatory sources are studied along with the texts that they explain.  
Therefore, when citing to the sources that accompany the Mishnah and the Talmud, the cited 
source will be the text of either the Mishnah or the Talmud, with the commentator in 
parentheses.  Finally, throughout this article all references to the Talmud refer to the 
Babylonian Talmud as opposed to the Jerusalem Talmud. 
34Maimonides lived from 1135-1204 C.E.  11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Maimonides, 
Moses 754 (1994).  He is regarded as the “most illustrious figure in Judaism in the post-
talmudic era.”  Id.  One of his most prolific works, Mishnah Torah, classifies, by subject 
matter, the entire Talmudic and post-Talmudic Judaic law literature; it codifies all of Jewish 
law in a 14 volume black letter law compendium.  Id. at 767.  Mishnah Torah is relied upon as 
a source that provides final rulings of law for many Judaic law questions. 
35See MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32. 
36Kiddushin 26A (Talmud) (Rabbi Asher Ben Isaac). 
37Deuteronomy 11:31. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/8
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mean that possession occurs through settlement.38  Initially, it seems that much like 
purchasing land or receiving it as a gift, chazakah is recognized as a valid form of 
land transfer.39 
A successful chazakah claim requires the adverse possessor to establish four 
elements, all of which are reminiscent of adverse possession: Actual Possessor, (2) 
Notice (Open and Notorious), (3) Hostility, and (4) Continuous Possessor for the 
Statutory Period. 
1.  Actual Possession 
Essentially, chazakah claims arise on three possible grounds.  Each situation, 
though, is a form of actual possession.  (1) Residence.  If a person lives on a plot of 
land and acts as though it is his, he may qualify for asserting his ownership through 
chazakah.40  This scenario requires that possessor to use the property the way owners 
in that region tend to use their property.41  In other words, if the property consisted of 
a house in a city, the possessor would be required to live in the house.  If, however, it 
were a beach house, where people only vacationed during the summer, living there 
during the summer would be sufficient.  (2) Improvements.  A second scenario where 
chazakah may be appropriate is one where the possessor makes improvements to the 
property.42  If the property were a farm and the possessor can prove that he had 
fertilized the field or planted crops, he would then be permitted to assert his 
ownership interests via chazakah because his actions clearly indicate that he had 
improved the land.  (3) Benefits.  Finally, when a possessor benefits directly from 
property, he may assert chazakah.43  If a possessor can prove that he had eaten fruit 
from trees on the property, or that he had rented a room in a house to a tenant, he 
may establish that he had physically benefited from the property.  He, therefore, 
would be permitted to assert a valid chazakah claim.  These grounds all indicate 
forms of actual possession rather than abstract claims of ownership. 
2. Notice (Open and Notorious) and Hostility 
Second requirement of chazakah is the potential for notice.  The requirement not 
only calls for notice to the true owner that someone is using his property, but also 
notice to the possessor that the true owner has protested and asserted his ownership 
rights.  The third element of Chazakah requires the possessor to be hostile as to the 
true owner; a protest from the true owner within the statute of limitations destroys a 
chazakah and begins an action for removal.  The Mishnah in Bava Basra explains 
the notice and hostility requirements.  The territory surrounding and including 
modern-day Israel is divided into three regions: Israel proper, called Judea; 
Transjordan, the area on the eastern side of the Jordan River in present-day Jordan; 
                                                                
38Kiddushin 26A (Talmud). 
39See discussion infra Part III.B., rejecting this initial approach to chazakah. 
4013 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT Chazakah 466 (1972). 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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and the Galilee, land that is today in northern Israel.44  The Mishnah explains that the 
possessor and the true owner must be in the same region for a chazakah claim to 
ripen.  “If [the true owner] was in Judea and [the possessor] took possession in the 
Galilee . . . it is no chazakah, until [the true owner] is with [the possessor] in the 
[same] province.”45  By way of explanation, the commentators to the Mishnah 
provide as follows: 
If the owner of a field located in the Galilee was living in Judea, and 
someone occupied that field for three years, the chazakah is not valid.  
Travel between these two regions was generally so sparse that it could not 
be assumed that word of a protest lodged in one province would reach the 
other province, and the situation was analogous to a border which lies 
between two hostile nations.  Accordingly, there was no point for the 
owner of the field to protest its occupation even if he knew of the 
situation, since word of his protest would not reach the occupant in any 
case.46 
The Mishnah clearly indicates the need for notice; however, notice is satisfied 
with constructive notice rather than actual notice.  If actual notice were required, it 
would not matter whether the possessor and the true owner were in the same 
province or in different ones, the possessor would be required to prove that the true 
owner had knowledge.  In fact, all the Mishnah requires is that the parties be located 
within the same province so that notice is possible.47  As long as they are in the same 
province, notice and hostility are presumed.48 
3.  Continuous Possession for the Statutory Period 
The final element of chazakah requires actual possession throughout a statute of 
limitations period.49  It is insufficient to simply use land in one of the three above-
mentioned ways and then exert a chazakah claim.  Though Judaic law accepts a 
three-year statute of limitations for chazakah in essentially the same way that 
American law recognizes adverse possession’s statute of limitations, exactly how the 
three years is calculated is the subject of some discussion. 
The third chapter of Bava Basra explains as follows: 
                                                                
44Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah).  In Mishnaic times, “the land of Israel was divided into three 
regions, each of which was considered a separate land in regard to the issue of chazakah . . . .” 
ARTSCROLL MISHNAH SERIES: BAVA BASRA 57-58 (Rabbis Nosson Scherman et al. eds.) 
(Rabbi Matis Roberts trans. 1997) [hereinafter ARTSCROLL MISHNAH]. 
45Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah). 
46ARTSCROLL MISHNAH supra note 44, at 58 (internal citations omitted).  Additionally, in 
Mishnaic times the borders between the regions were actually closed; there was much more of 
a separation than just sparse travel.  Id.  It should also be noted that if the possessor would not 
be on notice that the true owner has protested, in all likelihood, the true owner would not be on 
notice that someone else was occupying his land. 
47Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah). 
48Id. 
49Bava Basra 28A (Talmud). 
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Possession of houses, pits, ditches, vaults, dovecotes, bathhouses, olive 
presses, irrigated fields . . . and anything which provides benefit 
continually – [must be] three years day to day.  A field watered by rain 
must be possessed three years, but not from day to day.  Rabbi Yishmael 
says: Three months in the first, three in the last, and twelve months in 
between, [for] a total of eighteen months.  Rabbi Akiva says: One month 
in the first, one month in the last, and twelve months in between, [for] a 
total of fourteen months.50 
Rabbi Yishmael further limits his calculation to a field of grain.51  For an orchard 
with multiple fruit and vegetable trees and plants, which ripen at different times of 
year, however, if the adverse possessor harvests all of the different species in one 
year, he will satisfy the three-year requirement.52  All, however, agree that possession 
must be continuous.53  Citing the Talmud, the Mishnaic commentators assert that 
“[o]ne can establish ownership by virtue of possession only if he retains and uses 
these properties for three full years.  These three years must be consecutive.  If they 
are not, though he uses the property for a total of three years” he has not established 
a chazakah.54 
At this point it seems that chazakah and adverse possession are substantially 
similar; they require roughly identical elements and they both result in what appears 
                                                                
50Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah). 
51Id. 
52Id. (Rabbi Ovadia Bartenura).  The disagreement between Rabbi Yishmael and other 
rabbis is based on their disparate explanations of how chazakah works.  All compare chazakah 
to a goring bull; while the other rabbis view the comparison in broad terms, Rabbi Yishmael 
sees the comparison very narrowly.  See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 56. 
The comparison works as follows:  In Judaic law, if a bull gores another animal, courts 
view it as an unexpected occurrence and require the owner to pay for only half of the damages 
incurred because of his animal.  Once a bull has gored three times, however, courts must rule 
that this animal’s nature is to gore.  Id.  The owner will, therefore, be required to pay for full 
damages resulting from his bull from then on.  Id. 
Perhaps this is analogous to a type of negligence standard.  When an owner has no way to 
know that his bull is prone to attacking other animals, courts are reluctant to impose strict 
liability.  When the bull has shown a penchant for disruptive behavior, though, the owner is on 
notice that reasonable care requires more diligence.  Only then, will courts impose full 
liability. 
The majority of rabbis view the bull comparison broadly.  Id.  If for three years a person 
uses another person’s land, the other person is considered to be on notice.  Courts will view 
the true owner’s passive behavior as recognizing the adverse possessor as the true owner.  Id.  
Rabbi Yishmael, however, views the three-year requirement differently.  He looks at the act of 
harvesting.  While harvests usually occur once a year, resulting in a three year statute of 
limitations, in a field with multiple harvests in a year, each harvest puts the true owner on 
notice.  Each time the possessor raises and harvests crops, he is expressing his ownership.  In 
focusing on the number of harvests, Rabbi Yishmael employs a more narrow reading of the 
comparison to goring bulls.  See Bava Basra 28A, B (Talmud) (Tosafos). 
53Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah). 
54ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 53-54 (citing Bava Basra 29A (Talmud)). 
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to be a change in ownership from the true owner to the adverse possessor.55  It is, 
however, how the claims are asserted that indicates that they are of two very different 
species.  While adverse possession results in the actual transfer of property from the 
true owner to the adverse possessor, chazakah works very differently. 
B.  What Chazakah is Not 
1.  Companion Claims and Proofs of Ownership 
Most importantly, unlike in adverse possession where meeting the elements will 
result in the adverse possessor becoming the owner of the property, meeting the 
elements of chazakah in a vacuum will not effectuate a change in ownership.  To 
successfully argue that one owns land pursuant to a chazakah claim, a possessor 
must assert an additional claim with his chazakah argument.56  Even with this 
additional claim, chazakah will be recognized only as a proof of that companion 
claim of ownership.  The companion claim must follow a specific formula to warrant 
chazakah as proof of ownership: The possessor must assert that he bought the 
property,57 at one time had the deed, but has since lost that deed.58 
2.  Mishnaic and Talmudic Approaches 
The Mishnah provides as follows:  “Any [chazakah claim] not accompanied by a 
claim [of ownership] is not a [valid] chazakah.”59  The Mishnah continues to explain 
how a chazakah claim actually works by explaining how it does not work.  If, when 
brought to court in an ejectment proceeding, the possessor asserts that he has met the 
elements of chazakah but acknowledges that he lived there “because no one ever said 
anything to [him],” he will be unsuccessful in his chazakah argument.60  In other 
words, if he claims that he met the elements of chazakah but that when he originally 
                                                                
55Though the Judaic law texts do not expressly discuss an “exclusive” requirement, this 
element may be inferred from the other requirements.  If an owner is using his land together 
with someone else, he is less likely to actively assert his ownership, thereby rendering moot an 
exclusive requirement.  See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah) for a discussion of examples of non-
exclusive possessors.  The Mishnah says that “craftsmen, partners, sharecroppers, and 
administrators [may not assert] chazakah.”  Id. (Emphasis added).  Clearly the examples of 
partners and sharecroppers are instances where the possessor’s possession is not exclusive, 
and in those situations chazakah is inapplicable.  It would seem that, although the text does not 
state exclusivity as an element, the examples given indicate that it is, nonetheless, required. 
56Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).  See also Bava Basra 28B (Talmud) (asserting a chazakah 
claim without an additional claim of ownership is not a valid chazakah). 
57This is simply an example; he can likewise claim that he received it as a gift or as an 
inheritance.  Mishnah Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).  Additionally, if the possessor claims that he 
had inherited the land, he is not required to make an additional claim; he is not obligated to 
prove how the person from whom he inherited the land became the owner.  Id. 
58See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 60 (explaining Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah)). 
59Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). 
60Id. 
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began living on the land he believed that it had been ownerless,61 the true owner 
would be successful in the litigation and the chazakah claim will fail.62 
If, however, the possessor claims both that he has met the elements of chazakah 
and that the original owner had sold him the land, but he has since lost the deed, the 
possessor will be successful.63  the Mishnah creates a dichotomy by identifying two 
types of chazakah claims: Those that are accompanied by a companion claim of true 
ownership and those without a companion claim, made by squatters.64  A claim of 
chazakah is only as strong as its companion claim.65  The resulting doctrine is the 
conceptual antithesis of adverse possession.  While adverse possession serves to 
remove ownership from the true owner and vest it in the adverse possessor, chazakah 
does no such thing.  Rather, chazakah is merely proof of an independent claim of 
ownership.  
3.  Maimondies’s Explanation 
Maimonides, in his compilation of Judaic law, provides guidelines for asserting a 
chazakah claim.66  He begins with a simple rule of law:  Any land that A owns, even 
if that land is currently being lived upon by B, still belongs to A.67  Maimonides then 
provides an example to illustrate how the rule applies.  B resides on a piece of 
property in the way that people usually live there.  For example, he lives in a house, 
he rents or lends parts of the property to others, or he seeks restitution if something is 
stolen from the property.68  Eventually, claiming ownership to the land, A approaches 
B and initiates an action for ejectment.69  Specifically, A says to B, “This property on 
which you are living is mine and I had rented it to you.”70 
When B is faced with this challenge from A, his response will dictate how the 
case will proceed and who will be awarded ownership of the land.71  Maimonides 
describes exactly what a possessor must claim to be permitted to assert a chazakah 
                                                                
61This is a concept called hefker in Judaic law.  Asserting ownership over land that is 
hefker is essentially asserting ownership based on the theory of discovery.  Though it is 
unlikely that land would be “discovered” today, the scenario refers to one that is analogous to 
abandonment in the context of personal property.  In American law, just as in Judaic law, 
abandoned personal property may be acquired.  See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
62Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65For example, the chazakah claim will be viewed only as strong as the claim of 
ownership based on purchase or gift. 
66See MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32. 
67MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70Id.  A may likewise claim that he had lent it to B.  Id.  Or A may claim that B had stolen 
it from him.  Id. 
71Id. 
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claim.  Using language almost identical to the Mishnah’s, Maimonides instructs that 
any chazakah unaccompanied by a companion claim is not a valid argument.72  If B 
replies that, contrary to A’s claim, A had actually sold the land to B or had given it to 
him as a gift, the burden of proof rests with A to prove that he was the true owner of 
the land and that B was squatting on his land.73  If A successfully proves that he is the 
true owner of the land, he will retain ownership; if not, the court will award the 
property to B.74  Maimonides continues by explaining that a chazakah is 
inappropriate in the following scenario: B consumes produce from the property for a 
number of years and A, the true owner, approaches B, claiming ownership.75  If B 
responds to A’s claim by saying that he knew of no owner when he first came to the 
land, or if B claims that he has been on the land for a number of years and no one had 
said anything to him, courts will not accept chazakah as proof of his ownership.76  
Only when B asserts an independent claim of ownership77 will courts permit him to 
assert his compliance with the elements of chazakah, and then only as proof that he 
owns the land.78 
Maimonides clarifies the overarching rule of the chazakah doctrine.  Rather than 
chazakah creating ownership, it is merely a proof of ownership.  Without an 
independent claim of ownership, satisfying the elements of chazakah is worthless.  
In adverse possession, the only way a true owner can retain ownership is to disprove 
one of the elements of the adverse possession claim.  Chazakah is different.  For the 
true owner to be successful in defending his property, he may attack the elements of 
chazakah,79 or he may attack the sufficiency of the underlying transaction.80  The 
difference between adverse possession and chazakah can be boiled down to one 
point: Adverse possession is a mechanism through which one obtains ownership in 
property; chazakah merely creates a very strong, but rebuttable, presumption of 
ownership.  It is evidence of a transaction, not the transaction itself. 
                                                                
72Id. at 14:12.  See also Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). 
73MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1.  B does not automatically take title to 
the land; rather, he is required to affirm in court that he is not asserting a false claim.  Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. at 14:12. 
76Id. 
77That he bought the land or received it as a gift, for example. 
78MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 14:12. 
79He may, for example, establish that the possessor had occupied the land for only two 
years.  Successfully disproving any of the elements would destroy chazakah as a proof of 
ownership. 
80Even if the possessor successfully satisfied the elements of chazakah, if the true owner 
proves that a transaction never occurred, the true owner would remain the owner of the 
property.  See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah); MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1, 
14:12. 
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C.  Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom:  Illustrating the Difference Between  
Chazakah and Adverse Possession 
Perhaps the best way to explain how adverse possession and chazakah differ is to 
apply the doctrines to facts that would give rise to the claims.  The Alaska Supreme 
Court, in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, presented a classic case of adverse possession.81  
Though the court found that the possessors had established facts sufficient for an 
adverse possession claim,82 those facts alone would not support a chazakah claim. 
In Nome 2000, the adverse possessors established the following facts:  The 
parties disputed the ownership of seven and a half acres of land overlooking the 
Nome River.83  Nome 2000 was the true owner and titleholder for that property.84  
The disputed parcel was located in a rural area, which was suitable for seasonal, 
recreational activities, but at other times was virtually useless.85  From as early as 
1944, Charles Fagerstrom began using the disputed parcel of land.86  Around 1970, 
the Fagerstroms built a picnic area on the disputed parcel.  This area included a 
gravel pit, beachwood blocks that served as chairs, firewood, and a 50-gallon barrel 
that they used as a stove.87  The Fagerstroms also brought a camper trailer to the area, 
planted trees, and built an outhouse, fish rack, and reindeer shelter on the property.88  
Eventually, the Fagerstroms even built a cabin on the land.89  They continued to live 
there, at least in the summers, until Nome 2000 filed suit on July 24, 1987.  The 
Fagerstroms could declare over forty years worth of possession for the disputed 
property, well in excess of the ten-year statute of limitations required under Alaska 
law.90 
The Fagerstroms, however, never claimed that they bought the land.  Nor did 
they ever claim that they received a grant from the government for the disputed 
parcel.91  Essentially, all they asserted was that they were the only ones using the 
land over the last forty years.  Prior to that time, it appeared to be abandoned 
property, seemingly ownerless.  The Alaska Supreme Court applied the facts to the 
elements of adverse possession.  The court began by describing the elements of 
adverse possession: “In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the claimant 
                                                                
81Nome 2000, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990). 
82This was true for the northerly portion of the property in question.  See id. at 311.  For 
purposes of this example, therefore, this paper will focus only on the evidence established for 
the northerly portion of the property. 
83Id. at 306. 
84Id. 
85Id. at 307. 
86Id. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89Id. at 308. 
90Id. 
91They had, however, received a similar grant for surrounding plots of land.  See id. at 
307.  
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must prove . . . that for the statutory period ‘his use of the land was continuous, open 
and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true owner.’”92  The court reasoned as 
follows: 
The disputed parcel is located in a rural area suitable as a seasonal 
homesite for subsistence and recreational activities.  This is exactly how 
the Fagerstroms used it . . . . On the premises throughout the entire year 
were an outhouse, a fish rack, a large reindeer pen (which, for six weeks, 
housed a reindeer), a picnic area, a small quantity of building materials 
and some trees not indigenous to the area.  During the warmer season, for 
about 13 weeks, the Fagerstroms also placed a camper trailer on blocks on 
the disputed parcel.  The Fagerstroms and their children visited the 
property several times during the warmer season to fish, gather berries, 
clean the premises, and play.  In total, their conduct and improvements 
went well beyond “mere casual and occasional trespasses” and instead 
“evince[d] a purpose to exercise exclusive dominion over the property.”93 
The court continued, discussing how the Fagerstroms had met the elements of 
adverse possession: 
With respect to the notoriety requirement, a quick investigation of the 
premises, especially during the season which it was best suited for use, 
would have been sufficient to place a reasonably diligent landowner on 
notice that someone may have been exercising dominion and control over 
at least the northern portion of the property.  Upon such notice, further 
inquiry would indicate that members of the community regarded the 
Fagerstroms as the owners.  Continuous, exclusive, and [open and] 
notorious possession were thus established.94 
Recognizing an objective test, the court held that by acting toward the land as 
owners, the Fagerstroms met the hostility requirement; the court rejected Nome 
2000’s argument that the possessor’s intent matters.95  When a possessor acts as 
though he owns land, he will be deemed to have satisfied the hostility requirement. 
Courts simply engage in a matching game, essentially viewing the facts and the 
elements in two columns.  If a fact from column A can be matched with an element 
from column B and none of the elements will be left without a matching fact, a court 
will declare that adverse possession is met.  A possessor successfully winning the 
matching game becomes the proud new owner of a parcel of land.  This process was 
clearly at play in Nome 2000; all the court had to do was list the elements, find the 
facts that supported the elements, and rule in favor of the possessors.  Under adverse 
possession, nothing more is required. 
Applying the facts of Nome 2000 to chazakah would require a different result.  
The analysis should proceed as follows: 
                                                                
92Id. at 309 (quoting Smith v. Krebs, 768 P.2d 124, 125 (Alaska 1989)). 
93Id. at 310 (quoting Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830-31 
(Alaska 1974)) (emphasis added). 
94Id. (emphasis added). 
95Id. 
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Though there is no clear evidence that Nome 2000 actually resided in Alaska, 
there was ample evidence of at least constructive notice.96  The facts give no 
indication that Nome 2000’s potential objections to the Fagerstroms’ activities would 
have gone unheard.  The court also established that the Fagerstroms satisfied the 
hostility and continuous requirements far in excess of the three-year chazakah statute 
of limitations.97 
Nonetheless, under chazakah, the court would have been forced to reach a 
different conclusion.  The Fagerstroms never made any claim of rightful ownership.  
In fact, they all but admitted that they did not buy the land or acquire it through any 
other acceptable method of acquisition (save meeting the elements of adverse 
possession).  Rather than granting the land to the Fagerstroms, the court would have 
been required to accept Nome 2000’s title as valid and allow Nome 2000 to retain 
ownership over the land.  The facts in Nome 2000 do not support a finding for the 
Fagerstroms under chazakah because although the Fagerstroms would prove the 
elements of chazakah, they would still lack the most important ingredient necessary 
to become the owners, which is a claim of ownership.98 
IV.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION 
A.  Introduction 
Adverse possession is both justified and criticized on a number of grounds.  
Adopting chazakah presents an opportunity to alleviate the major criticisms of 
adverse possession while retaining many of the benefits of the current system.  This 
section outlines some of the major justifications for adverse possession.  The 
justifications for adverse possession fit into three categories: (1) Statute of 
Limitations Arguments, (2) Economic Arguments, and (3) Moral Arguments.99 
B.  Statute of Limitations Arguments 
The “running of the statute of limitations” justification for adverse possession 
looks at adverse possession as similar to a defense to any tort.  A plaintiff has a 
certain amount of time within which to bring suit for harms that he has suffered.100  A 
party failing to bring suit within that period of time is barred from litigating that 
cause of action.101  In the case of adverse possession, the rationale goes as follows: A 
true owner who fails to bring a claim for trespass within the statute of limitations for 
adverse possession is barred from suing the adverse possessor.102 
                                                                
96Id. 
97See id. 
98This is not to suggest that all cases of adverse possession would result in findings 
favoring true owners; rather, chazakah would require adverse possessors to modify their 
claims and assert adverse possession only as a supplement to a claim of true ownership. 
99Though there may be some overlap in the categories in which some of the arguments fit, 
they will be presented in the categories that seem most appropriate. 
100See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 90 (5th ed. 1998). 
101FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
102This view of adverse possession works especially well when the adverse possession 
claim is raised as a defense to a trespass claim rather than as an action brought by the adverse 
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This view of the statute of limitations prevents true owners from suing to protect 
against litigation based on “stale evidence.”103  The stale evidence factor highlights 
the concern that adverse possessors will be disadvantaged in defending against 
trespass claims because evidence proffered will often be many years, if not 
generations, old.104  Most adverse possession claims arise out of mistakes caused by 
uncertainty over boundary lines, mistakes that may take years to even be realized.105  
Simply put, adverse possession prevents a possessor from being penalized by an 
untimely claim.106  The statute of limitations, like the statutes of limitations for other 
                                                          
possessor to quiet title.  A variation on this view of the statute of limitations argument is that 
adverse possession serves to punish true owners.  CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE 
POSSESSION 43-45, 90 (1961).  The punishment is on two grounds: (1) The true owner’s failure 
to raise his trespass claim in a timely manner and (2) to punish the true owner for not 
adequately using his land.  The first rationale is merely the inverse of the classical statute of 
limitations argument; by protecting the defendant from having to litigate a stale claim, the 
plaintiff is necessarily punished. 
Unlike in the classical sense of adverse possession, where the suit would be “barred,” 
here, rather than preventing the suit’s litigation, courts do hear cases and, if the elements are 
met, “give the possessor ‘title’ to the land.”  Id. at 43.  Take, for example, Ohio’s one-year 
statute of limitations for slander: After that year, a suit for slander will not proceed.  Id.; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (West 2003).  In adverse possession, rather than the statute 
preventing the suit from proceeding, the statute serves as a timeframe: Within the statute of 
limitations, ownership remains with the true owner; after the statute of limitations, ownership 
transfers to the possessor.  
Rather than simply a device through which suits are barred, “adverse possession is a 
transfer effected by the statutes of limitations.”  POSNER, supra note 100, at 90. 
103See POSNER, supra note 100, at 90.  See also CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 83. Some 
have argued that statutes of limitations are “a practical device to spare the courts from 
litigation of old causes of action; but this has been denied vigorously . . . on the ground that 
since courts are established to deal with litigation it would be strange to forbid litigation so as 
not to bother courts.”  CALLAHAN at 86.  Barring the litigation of “stale claims” serves two 
purposes.  First, it helps minimize the costs inherent in corroborating deteriorated evidence, a 
natural result of claims that are many years old.  Merrill, supra note 19 at 1128.  Second, 
preventing “stale claims” assists in creating a system that is fairer for defendants by not 
requiring them to defend against claims based on old evidence.  Id. 
104CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 83.  “It is said, so frequently as to become monotonous, 
that statutes of limitations are designed to protect against stale claims after evidence has 
become lost, memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
There is an inherent tension in adverse possession questions: On the one hand, states require a 
relatively long period of time for their statutes of limitations for adverse possession, ostensibly 
to protect true owners.  See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494.  On the other hand, however, the 
extended period for adverse possession’s statutes of limitations increases the effects of lost 
evidence, faded memories, and witnesses who have disappeared. 
105POSNER, supra note 100, at 90. 
106CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 84.  The notion that the statute of limitations protects 
against untimely claims has a critical limitation: statutes of limitation remedy the concern that 
evidence will not be preserved.  “This concern is with the preservation of a potential 
defendant’s evidence, not a plaintiff’s; and it is limited to claims which it is assumed [the 
defendant] could have resisted successfully had the lost evidence been available.”  Id. 
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claims, protects defendants by preventing plaintiffs from winning claims based on 
“stale evidence.”107 
C.  Economic Arguments 
There are essentially three economic justifications for adverse possession.  First, 
adverse possession encourages the beneficial use of property.108  Second, adverse 
possession tends to make the real estate market more efficient.109  Finally, adverse 
possession protects the reliance interests accrued during the time of the adverse 
possessor’s occupation of the property.110 
Adverse possession encourages property owners to put their land to productive 
use rather than allow the property to lie fallow.  Putting property to use benefits the 
economy.  Adverse possession has been heralded as “a wonderful example of reward 
to useful labor, at the expense of the sluggard.”111  Rather than looking at the results 
of adverse possession as penalizing true owners, proponents of adverse possession 
regard adverse possession as rewarding possessors for positive acts in cultivating 
land.112  Adverse possession often has the effect of reducing the valuable resources 
that are left idle for lengthy periods of time; it establishes procedures for productive 
users to gain ownership over unproductive users.113  Though this theory refuses to 
recognize that a productive use of property might be to let it remain unused until a 
later date, what remains is that adverse possession encourages people, whether true 
owners or adverse possessors, to use land and reap the valuable economic gains 
resulting therefrom.114 
This justification for adverse possession “seems to rest on a social policy 
favoring ‘active’ owners of property, who develop . . . land, rather than ‘passive’ 
                                                                
107POSNER, supra note 100, at 90.  This also has a relationship to the economic arguments.  
Specifically, there is a cost inherent to mistakes of judgment arising out of stale claims.  This 
point, though, will be discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the economic 
justifications of adverse possession. 
108CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 91; CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 15 
(1994). 
109COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 156 (1988); Miceli, supra note 3, at 161; 
POSNER, supra note 100, at 90, this is essentially the reduction of the error costs. 
110POSNER, supra note 100, at 90; ROSE, supra note 108, at 15. 
111ROSE, supra note 108, at 15. 
112CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 90-91. 
113COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 156. 
114Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130.  A policy requiring property owners to use their land 
“seems dubious, because it ignores the possibility that passive owners, such as land 
speculators, may perform a valuable social function by preserving the property for use by 
future generations.”  Id.  Additionally, “there is a potential inefficiency of the rule: if the 
original owner values not using his property more than the adverse possessor values its use, 
then title should remain with the original owner.”  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 156.  
Even with these drawbacks to economic justifications for adverse possession, it is unclear that 
courts actually balance the interests of the parties when making determinations in adverse 
possession cases.  
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owners” who do not cultivate their property.115  A close look at this justification and 
its criticisms116 reveals how little a true owner must do to avoid losing his land.117  
“The [true owner] does not have to develop his land or even occupy it; all he has to 
do periodically is assert his right to exclude others.”118  By rewarding those who 
beneficially use land, adverse possession aids in creating a more economically 
productive system; this system is brought back to equilibrium to protect true owners 
by requiring very little of true owners for them to retain ownership of their property. 
The second economic justification for adverse possession is that creates a more 
efficient and less costly real estate market.  Again, adverse possession shows a 
preference for active possessors over passive owners.119 
The passive (and presumably absentee) owner will be harder to negotiate 
with, if only because he will be harder to locate.  When the [true owner] is 
required to assert his right to exclude . . . he is in effect being asked to 
“flush out” offers to purchase his property, to make a market in the land  
. . . . [T]he sleeping-owner rationale is again a justification based on the 
desirability of encouraging market transactions in property rights.120 
By transferring title to an adverse possessor, making him into a true owner, 
adverse possession increases market efficiency.  One of the goals of adverse 
possession is to create certainty in the real estate market.121  More certainty should 
equal more efficiency.  Adverse possession reduces the “administration costs of 
establishing rightful ownership claims in the event of a delayed dispute about 
rightful ownership.”122  Assume that A is a true owner and B is an adverse possessor 
who has met all the elements of adverse possession.  After seventy-five years,123 B 
sells Blackacre to C.  Absent adverse possession, if A sues C over Blackacre, an 
inefficiency would exist in the real estate market. The administrative costs of 
litigating suits like these would increase the cost of buying the property.  “Adverse 
possession clears title of the clouds (as they are called) upon it from past wrongs, so 
buyers need not fear the assertion of third party claims based upon events of the 
distant past.”124  Adverse possession allows purchase prices to reflect land values 
rather than insurance against suits and costs of researching ownership. 
The efficiency argument takes an additional form, one that closely relates to the 
statute of limitations justifications.  Recognizing adverse possession as a method of 
                                                                
115Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130. 
116See supra note 114. 
117Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130. 
118Id. 
119Id. 
120Id. at 1130-1131 (emphasis added). 
121JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 226 (3d ed. 2002). 
122COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 155. 
123This period of time would satisfy even the lengthiest of statutes of limitations. 
124Id. 
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land transfer reduces “error costs” caused by using stale evidence in dispute 
resolution.125  This goes beyond looking simply at the adverse possessor versus the 
true owner.  Adverse possession is a tool that has the effect of clearing up title for 
generations, for numerous buyers.126  Adverse possession requires a vision of the 
future.  Ownership of land affects future buyers and the banks or other institutions 
that will advance funds for the purchase of that property.  Individuals need to know 
who owns the property they wish to buy or for which they intend to provide a 
mortgage.127  Allowing adverse possession to effect a transfer both reduces search 
costs of investigating who holds title to property and aids in a system where recorded 
titles are incomplete indices of ownership.128 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing in 1897, discussed the economic implications 
and justifications of adverse possession.129  We can view the ownership of a piece of 
property like a scale.  On the one side is the adverse possessor.  He has lived on the 
land, used the land, and generally regarded the land as belonging to him.  On the 
other side of the balance is the true owner.130  For a long period of time, he has made 
no indication that he has any ownership stake in the land.  During the time when the 
adverse possessor resides on the property, he builds an attachment to that land.  Over 
the same period of time, the true owner’s attachment to the same piece of land is 
necessarily reduced.131  Were the adverse possessor to lose the land in favor of the 
true owner, the loss, both economic and moral, suffered by the adverse possessor 
would far outweigh the gain experienced by the true owner.132 
This justification for adverse possession can be quantified by the theory of 
“diminishing marginal utility of income.”133  If a court would award the disputed 
property to the true owner, the adverse possessor would experience the loss of the 
property as a diminution in his wealth.  The true owner would view the restoration of 
the property as an increase in his wealth.134  This argument asserts that if both the 
adverse possessor and the true owner have the same wealth, “then probably their 
combined utility will be greater if the adverse possessor is allowed to keep the 
                                                                
125POSNER, supra note 100, at 90. 
126Id. 
127Id. 
128Id.  This second outcome of adverse possession, allowing adverse possession as a 
means of remedying an incomplete recording system, however, something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  By recognizing adverse possession as a means of obtaining ownership, the 
incomplete system is reinforced and perpetuated rather than remedied.  Adverse possession, 
itself, is an institution that validates the unrecorded “ownership” of property. 
129Id. at 89 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 
477 (1897)). 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133Id. at 89-90. 
134Id. at 90. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
644 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:623 
property.”135  Clearly, the adverse possessor was using the property,136 and the true 
owner was not.137  Therefore, by removing property from someone who has relied 
upon his ownership of the property and is deriving actual benefit from it and giving it 
to someone who is deriving no actual benefit from it and has not, within the last 
many years at least, relied upon his ownership, marginal utility of income is reduced. 
D.  Moral Arguments 
The final justification for adverse possession rests on the morality of keeping 
land in the possession of the adverse possessor.  Again, Holmes is instructive.  In a 
letter to William James, Holmes wrote that the adverse possessor “shape[s] his roots 
to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be 
displaced without cutting at his life.”138  Property rights are based on more than 
formal documents; they are based also on expectations.  Those expectations “grow 
from informal arrangements such as long-standing possession, a course of dealings, 
oral statements, informal understandings, personal relationships, social practices, and 
customs of trade.”139  The notion that long-standing possession creates an expectation 
of ownership is exactly the idea that justifies adverse possession.  The moral 
argument justifying adverse possession views “long-standing possession” as 
equivalent to a written document of ownership.  If those are viewed equally, then 
adverse possession places courts on the moral high ground by favoring the party that 
stands to lose the most, the adverse possessor.  A ruling against the adverse 
possessor would result in the court “cutting at his life.”140 
Often, the moral justifications are intertwined with reliance justifications.  
Protecting the reliance on relationships has been deemed a valuable moral 
justification for adverse possession.141  This theory asserts that over time, in this 
instance the period of the statute of limitations, the adverse possessor grows to rely 
on the true owner’s acquiescence that the owner will not interfere with the 
                                                                
135Id. 
136This obviously is true because one of the elements of adverse possession is “open and 
notorious” possession.  Without actually using the property, the adverse possessor is unlikely 
to be able to prove that he openly possessed the property. 
137This must likewise be true because of the “exclusive” element of adverse possession; if 
the true owner also uses the land, the adverse possessor’s claim fails. 
138Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermkts. Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (quoting Justice 
Holmes). 
139JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 45-46 (2000). 
140Id. at 46.  See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993).  A 
theory called Lockean Entitlement advocates for land to stay with the possessor who has used 
the property beneficially over the owner who has been passive in his ownership. 
[T]he pure Lockean theory does not countenance adverse possession.  But perhaps it 
colors the theory of adverse possession anyway by lending some sympathy to 
“squatters.”  After all, if property is acquired from the common by a nonowner simply 
by taking it and using it, can we not sympathize with someone who does likewise with 
owned but unused property, especially if she does not know it is owned? 
Id. at 112. 
141SINGER, supra note 121, at 229. 
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possessor’s possession.142  “The possessor comes to expect and may have come to 
rely on the fact that the true owner will not interfere with the possessor’s use of the 
property . . . and the true owner has fed those expectations by her actions (or her 
failure to act).”143 
Professor Margaret Jane Radin suggested another moral argument in favor of 
adverse possession.  Building on Holmes’s explanation that taking property away 
from an adverse possessor results in “cutting at his life,” Radin presents an argument 
based on justice and fairness.144  Property interests in personal property must be 
distinguished from property interests in fungible property.145  Fungible property is 
property that is capable of being replaced with money, whereas personal property 
“has become bound up with the personhood of the holder [that it] is no longer 
commensurate with money.”146  While the adverse possessor’s interest is initially 
fungible, it becomes increasingly more personal over time.147  Conversely, over the 
same period of time, the true owner’s interest becomes less and less personal, 
becoming ever more fungible.148  Adverse possession advocates awarding the 
property to the party who will be less easily compensated for losing that piece of 
land.  In fact, as Radin’s argument goes, justice requires such a result.149 
V.  CRITICISMS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
A.  Introduction 
Adverse possession, though justified on numerous grounds, is riddled with 
criticisms.  Though a great deal of ink has been spilled to justify adverse possession 
from an economic point of view,150 one of the major criticisms of adverse possession 
rests in the economic havoc that adverse possession wreaks.151  Additionally, and 
perhaps most importantly, is the criticism that adverse possession is simply unfair.152  
                                                                
142Id. 
143Id. (quoting Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 666-667 (1988)).  It would seem that there is a flaw in this argument.  If the justification 
for adverse possession is based on the possessor’s reliance on the owner’s consent, tacit 
though it may be, the hostility element of adverse possession is destroyed, thus requiring a 
finding in favor of the true owner, not the adverse possessor. 
144Id. at 228 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 739, 748 n.26 (1986)). 
145Id. 
146Id. (quoting Radin, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. at 748). 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149Id. 
150See supra Part IV.C. 
151Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo. L.J. 2419, 2432 
(2001). 
152Carl W. Herstein, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 815, 889 n.281 
(2002). 
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Finally, unlike all other land transfers and methods of acquiring property, adverse 
possession allows acquisition with nothing more than unilateral actions taken by 
adverse possessors.153  Every other method of land transfer is bilateral in nature, 
requiring actions taken by both parties to the transaction.  What chazakah provides is 
the ability to reduce the economic costs of adverse possession through a more just 
system, which relies on the classical bilateral actions that typically create land 
transfers. 
B.  Economic Costs of Adverse Possession 
There are a number of costs associated with adverse possession.  First, a result of 
adverse possession is the diminished utility in property.154  Diminished utility results 
because under adverse possession true owners are less inclined to allow people to use 
their property.155  This occurs even, if not especially, when the true owner is not 
himself using the property and may not even be bothered by the trespasser.156  Rather 
than risk losing his land to an adverse possessor, a true owner is more vigilant about 
removing trespassers.157  This fear of losing property results in a net loss in the value 
derived from the land.  Instead of the land giving benefit (albeit to the trespasser), 
that benefit is lost.  This loss illustrates a deficiency in adverse possession.158 
There are other costs resulting from adverse possession.  To protect their land 
from the possibility of losing it to adverse possessors, true owners are forced to 
spend money to monitor their property.159  Assets that could be otherwise spent must 
now be devoted to continually traveling the metes and bounds of one’s property, or 
finding some other method of ensuring that trespassers do not spend extended 
periods of time on a true owner’s property.  It is not entirely clear that society 
benefits from this duty imposed on landowners.  In all likelihood, the time and 
money expended on monitoring the land results in nothing more than a waste of 
resources.160 
                                                                
153Perhaps the one exception to this is discovery.  Nonetheless, discovery differs from 
adverse possession, in that no one loses land as a result of discovery; it is simply not a land 
transfer.  Even abandonment, another example of a party acquiring land where no one loses 
anything, requires an affirmative act by the original owner.  Adverse possession does not 
require any such act by the true owner.  To the contrary, an act of abandonment would 
alleviate the need for the adverse possessor to prove the elements of adverse possession.  
Finally, prescriptive easements do not result in the transfer of property ownership, only the 
right to use.  The right to use is only one stick in the “bundle of rights” associated with 
property ownership.  Adverse possession, in contrast, transfers the entire bundle of sticks. 
154Stake, supra note 151, at 2432. 
155Id. at 2432-33. 
156If the true owner were using the property, the “exclusive” element of adverse possession 
might be destroyed. 
157Indeed, vigilance, or rather the lack thereof, is cited as a justification for adverse 
possession. 
158Stake, supra note 151, at 2432-33. 
159Id. 
160Id. 
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In addition to the losses experienced by the reduced incentive to allow people to 
use otherwise unused property and the wasted funds spent on increased monitoring 
of land, there is another potential cost to adverse possession.  Adverse possession, it 
is said, encourages people to productively use land.161  It is possible, however, that 
the best use of land is not “using” it at all.162  Sometimes allowing land to remain 
unused is an investment for the future.  In such an instance, not using the land might 
be the best “use” the owner can put it to at a given time.  Trespassers are encouraged 
to make changes to the land, if only to become adverse possessors.  Land that a true 
owner intends to set aside to remain in its pristine, natural state, undeveloped, and 
unharmed by human contamination, may fall prey to the whims of an opportunistic 
trespasser, who sees this oasis of natural splendor as the perfect site to build a 
garbage dump or an aluminum reduction facility.  Adverse possession has the side 
effect of encouraging land development, even in instances where doing so might not 
be putting the land to its optimal use.163  By rewarding adverse possessors for 
destroying natural landscapes, adverse possession detracts from the overall utility of 
the property.164 
C.  Adverse Possession’s Unfairness 
When the doctrine of adverse possession is taught in law school property classes, 
it is often met with hostility from students who prefer a system that respects the 
autonomy of property owners.  That autonomy, they believe, should include the right 
not to use one’s land.  This is essentially an invocation of the “unfairness” criticism 
of adverse possession.  Adverse possession all but ensures that there will be 
instances where “poor, unsuspecting, innocent owners lose all or part of their land 
without having done anything wrong.”165  Even in instances where a true owner has 
been less than vigilant in overseeing his property, adverse possession still seems 
unfair.  At the end of the day, when evaluating the competing claims for the 
property, adverse possession ignores the reality that the true owner paid for the 
property, whereas the adverse possessor, by definition, did not.166  This doctrine also 
appears to reward an individual for essentially stealing another’s property.167  
                                                                
161This has been cited as a justification for adverse possession.  See Cooter & Ulen, supra 
note 109. 
162Stake, supra note 151, at 2433. 
163Id. 
164The immediate benefits resulting from encouraging people to use land should at least be 
balanced with the foregone benefits that the land might have produced in the future.  It is quite 
possible that those benefits would far outweigh any benefits possibly reaped by using land 
simply for the purpose of showing ownership over it, whether that use is done by the true 
owner to protect his rights, or by the adverse possessor to secure an interest in someone else’s 
land. 
165Id. at 2434.  It would likewise seem unfair that a court could require a person to monitor 
his land just to retain ownership over it. 
166Herstein, supra note 152, at 889 n.281. 
167Id.  Even in instances of good faith occupations by adverse possessors, the truth of the 
matter is that the adverse possessor was using something that did not belong to him.  The 
result of adverse possession is unjust; we reward trespassers for continuously trespassing.  
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Adverse possession essentially becomes state-sponsored trespassing, rewarding a 
trespasser with the property on which he has violated another’s ownership interests. 
D.  Bilateral Nature of Other Land Transfers vs. Unilateral Nature  
of Adverse Possession 
Finally, when addressing how adverse possession occurs, it becomes clear that it 
is simply the result of unilateral acts.  Typical property transfers, by contrast, occur 
through bilateral methods.  In the case of property acquired through sale, there must 
be a buyer and a seller.  Likewise, a gift requires a donor and a donee, an inheritance 
needs bequeathor and an inheritor, and conquest requires a conqueror and a 
vanquished.  In each instance, there is a party giving and a party receiving.  Even 
when looking to personal property, for a finder to become an owner, the original 
owner must abandon the property.168  Never does one acquire something without 
someone else giving it up.169 
                                                                
168See supra, note 2. 
169Even in the most unilateral-looking methods of acquiring land, a bilateral aspect still 
exists.  In American history, the example of the squatters looks like a unilateral act.  On its 
surface, it seems that the squatters of America’s early years would move onto a plot of land, 
work the land, and eventually own the land; seemingly, their actions alone created their 
ownership rights in the land.  A closer look at the forces at play in the squatters example, 
however, indicates that there really was another party to the acquisition; not only did the 
squatters act, but the government also acted.  In the case of those squatters and others after 
them, but for the eventual government acquiescence, the squatters’ rights were only as strong 
as their protests.  Essentially, before the U.S. government gave in, the squatters were 
successful only by frightening off potential buyers at government auctions. 
From the survey Ordinance of 1785 on, squatters settled large areas of the public lands 
in defiance of law . . . without color of title other than that created by the impact of 
popular feeling that would not be denied.  At government auctions, they assembled in 
force unlawfully to frighten off free outside bidding and prevent competition from 
forcing any of their company to pay the public land office more than the legal 
minimum . . . . Often unlawful in origin, settlement nevertheless quickly brought 
effective demand for law.   
SINGER, supra note 121, at 27 (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-5 (1956) (discussing the squatters of 
Pike Creek, Wisconsin)).  “A whole continent was sold or given away – to veterans, settlers, 
squatters, railroads, [and] states . . . .” SINGER, supra note 121, at 26 (quoting LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 231 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added)).  Clearly, 
squatters owned nothing without some government action.  When the government eventually 
gave in to the squatters, the other half of bilateralism occurred. 
Compare the experience of the squatters with that of the freed slaves in the post-Civil War 
era.  “When planters had fled, abandoning their properties, the freed slaves had in numerous 
instances seized control and they gave little indication after the war of yielding their authority 
to the returning owners.”  LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF 
SLAVERY 399-407 (1980).  Nonetheless, although some of the freed slaves were able to 
acquire land through the Homestead Act of 1861, state governments refused to allow them to 
claim ownership of the land of the former slaveholders.  Id.  Though one could argue that the 
former slave owners’ abandonment of the property provided the second half of the bilateral 
action, courts refused to accept that argument in light of President Andrew Jackson’s 
Proclamation of Amnesty on May 29, 1865.  Id.  Unlike in the case of the squatters, where the 
government claimed ownership of the land in question, and were thus in a position to grant the 
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It appears that in all instances of acquiring property, ownership results from 
bilateral activities.  Adverse possession, however, requires a different conclusion.  
Adverse possession is the poster-child for unilateral activities resulting in claims of 
ownership.  Unlike theft, where ownership based on unilateral actions is not 
recognized, adverse possession allows the actions of the adverse possessor to vest 
title in him at the expense of the non-acting true owner. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM CHAZAKAH 
Chazakah satisfies adverse possession’s justifications.  The analysis of how 
chazakah satisfies the “statutes of limitation” justification for adverse possession 
begins with a recognition that unlike the statutes of limitation for other torts, which 
prevent a case’s litigation, the statute of limitations for adverse possession does 
not.170  Statutes of limitation are designed to prevent plaintiffs from taking advantage 
of lost or otherwise damaged evidence, which naturally occurs over time.171  
Chazakah is a doctrine that not only recognizes the potential for lost evidence, but is 
also based on that potential.  Chazakah claims arise because an adverse possessor 
claims ownership but cannot document ownership because of the passage of time, 
the very “stale evidence” contemplated by a statute of limitations.172 
Under chazakah, once the adverse possessor proves the elements of adverse 
possession, the burden of proof shifts to the true owner.  While the adverse possessor 
might have difficulty defending against a trespass claim simply because of the 
passage of time, chazakah provides him an escape hatch.  If the adverse possessor 
claims rightful ownership and proves the elements of adverse possession, the true 
owner will have the burden of disproving the ownership.  The potential for a 
defendant having to defend against a claim where his evidence has been lost is 
rectified by a system that requires the one attempting to take the land, the true owner, 
to have preserved evidence.  Chazakah requires no more instances of litigation than 
does adverse possession.  It is a system that gives true owners the ability to regain 
what was taken from them without compensation,173 while still protecting an adverse 
possessor from a claim based on stale evidence. 
Chazakah likewise maintains the status quo on the economic justifications of 
adverse possession.  Chazakah encourages the beneficial use of property and protects 
reasonable reliance interests.  It does so, not by creating a system that dictates that 
the beneficial use of property is to build on it, but rather by creating a system that 
rewards any use of property, even a use that seems to be no use at all.  This makes 
                                                          
land to the squatters, the government did not claim that it owned the land of the former slave 
owners, and could not, therefore, give anything to the freed slaves.  
170See supra, note 104.  This is necessary because chazakah requires litigation.  
Nonetheless, chazakah does not require more litigation than adverse possession. 
171See Callahan, supra note 102, at 83; Merrill, supra note 19, at 1128; Posner, supra note 
100, at 90. 
172Were that not the case, and the adverse possessor capable of producing the deed, the 
chazakah claim would be irrelevant; the deed, rather than the occupation, would prove 
ownership. 
173See supra note 102.  Statutes of limitation are designed to protect defendants from 
claims based on stale evidence, but if the evidence has not been lost, perhaps a different result 
makes sense. 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
650 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:623 
economic sense; what today might be worth $1,000 if one were to build on it, might 
just as well be worth $10,000 five years from now.  Imagine that A owns Blackacre, 
which might be worth only $24 dollar’s worth of trinkets today.  It may, however, be 
worth many billions if not trillions of dollars many years later.174  Nonetheless, it is 
possible that actually using the land might be beneficial and that does not go un-
rewarded.175 
An adverse possessor under chazakah who uses the land does not walk away 
empty handed.  If he proves the elements of adverse possession, he retains a 
presumption of ownership.  An adverse possessor’s work is rewarded with a 
presumption of ownership, but not with the rights to continue to occupy property that 
he stole, if that is in fact the case.  Chazakah provides the adverse possessor with an 
opportunity to retain ownership, but only if he is adjudged to have a rightful claim of 
ownership.  It does not punish a true owner for owning land but not wanting to “use” 
the land in the active sense. 
The efficiency argument may seem to be lost in chazakah because there is the 
potential that one who buys land from an adverse possessor will be required to return 
it to the true owner, but that is not quite the case.  The efficiency argument seems to 
be significantly overstated because it relies heavily upon the assumption that adverse 
possession creates greater predictability in the real estate market.  Undoubtedly, there 
will be instances where one who buys land from an adverse possessor will be 
required to relinquish that property back to the true owner, but this is true under both 
adverse possession and chazakah.  If a court were to find that the adverse possessor 
failed to prove one of the elements of adverse possession, then an otherwise 
legitimate buyer would be buying land from a trespasser rather than an owner.  
Chazakah, while creating a system that is more protective of true owners, places only 
the trespasser in a more costly position than he would otherwise be under adverse 
possession.176 
Shaping one’s roots to his surroundings does not create ownership, buying land 
does.  Morality dictates that people who have claims of ownership should own land.  
Having merely a claim of occupation does not create ownership.  But even under 
chazakah, Holmes should be satisfied.  The occupier enters court with a presumption 
                                                                
174According to legend, Peter Minuit bought Manhattan Island from the Manhattan Indian 
Tribe for trinkets worth about $24 and the United States bought the Louisiana Purchase from 
France for nearly $15 million.  Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, Minuit, Peter (2003) at 
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=397555 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
175Remember that the adverse possessor in chazakah still leaves with a presumption of 
ownership. 
176But even under chazakah, the adverse possessor is not in a bad position.  Assume that 
an adverse possessor sells land for $1,000.  If the true owner successfully proves that the 
adverse possessor had no ownership interest in the land under chazakah, the buyer would be 
forced to relinquish the land back to the true owner.  But all is not lost for the buyer; he can 
still bring an action against the adverse possessor to recover his losses.  Doing so does not put 
the adverse possessor in a worse position than before the transaction, it restores him to where 
he was at that point.  By selling land that does not belong to him, the adverse possessor 
experienced a gain at the expense of the true owner.  Now, equilibrium is restored: The true 
owner has not lost his property, the buyer has regained what he lost in buying the property, 
and the adverse possessor has neither gained nor lost anything, he is right where he started, a 
trespasser who comes into the relationship with nothing and leaves with nothing as well. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/8
2004-05]     CHAZAKAH: JUDAIC LAW’S NON-ADVERSE POSSESSION 651 
of ownership, which is a presumption that must be rebutted before the occupier is 
asked to leave the property.  Though the adverse possessor’s interest might be 
personal rather than fungible, if he indeed bought the property or came to it in some 
legitimate way, he will retain his personal rights.  If, however, he came to the land 
mistakenly or as a trespasser, chazakah looks at the morality of awarding ownership 
over the property.  If a trespasser, chazakah dictates that the adverse possessor lose 
the property, if a rightful owner, chazakah requires his vindication. 
Up to this point, it appears that chazakah would merely replace adverse 
possession with a doctrine that is only slightly different, perhaps only by changing its 
focus.  Nonetheless, chazakah really provides much more than that.  Not only does 
chazakah maintain adverse possession’s justifications, but it also remedies adverse 
possession’s shortcomings.  Chazakah should be accepted because it provides an 
institution that is less costly and fairer than adverse possession. 
The most important feature of chazakah is that it evidences a transaction and 
ownership; it is not the transaction itself.  Chazakah, therefore, does not have the 
necessary costs or fairness issues that plague adverse possession.  Forcing adverse 
possession to resemble chazakah, forces adverse possession to recognize bilateral 
actions as effectuating transfer.  This pushes adverse possession to fall in line with 
all other methods of land transfer. 
For a true owner to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim 
under chazakah, he can attack the adverse possessor on two fronts.  First, he can 
attack the elements of adverse possession; by disproving any one of those elements, 
the true owner retains ownership over his property.177  Alternatively, the true owner 
could attack the claim of ownership itself.  The true owner would be just as 
successful in retaining ownership over his property by proving that the adverse 
possessor never bought the land in the first place, as he would be by disproving any 
of the elements of adverse possession.  The result of this two-tiered system is that the 
costs of adverse possession are reduced, if not completely removed.178  Were a true 
owner permitted to retain ownership in light of an adverse possession claim by 
merely proving that no transaction divesting him of his property occurred, he would 
be less inclined to prevent others from using his otherwise unused portion of his 
property.  The costs that currently plague adverse possession would cease to exist in 
the chazakah framework. 
Unlike adverse possession, which views the adverse possessor as a trespasser 
turned owner, chazakah views the adverse possessor as a true owner.  A system that 
rewards someone for buying property and using his possession as proof of such 
purchase is far more palatable than a system that rewards a trespasser who just 
                                                                
177This would work much the same way that the adverse possession doctrine currently 
works. 
178Surely, the true owner who fears that he will be hauled into court in a suit to quiet title 
could monitor his land, but he is no longer required to in order to prevail.  In that case, the 
owner who monitor’s his land does so voluntarily, rather than as a mechanism to keep his 
property.  He would be akin to the homeowner who installs a security system; he is not 
required to do so to keep his home, but he does so to voluntarily protect his interests.  The true 
owner could, instead, keep good records of his ownership and the taxes he has paid on the 
property.  Should he be forced to defend himself in an action to quiet title, or litigate a trespass 
suit against an adverse possession defense for that matter, he could provide his records of 
ownership as proof of that no transaction took place. 
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avoided being caught in time for the true owner to bring a claim.  Under chazakah, 
courts would be expected to weigh the adverse possessor’s claim that he bought the 
land but lost the deed, against the true owner’s claim that no such sale took place.  
Courts would look at the elements of adverse possession only as evidence that such a 
transaction took place.  If the adverse possessor proves the elements of adverse 
possession, he gains a presumption of ownership to be rebutted by the true owner.  
Clearly, this puts the true owner in a better position than under the current system of 
adverse possession.  Rather than simply losing his property because the adverse 
possessor satisfactorily proves the elements, the true owner still has the ability to 
retain ownership if he can prove that no sale took place.  Ruling against the true 
owner suggests that a transaction did take place.  There is no question that if a 
transaction took place, it is not unfair for the adverse possessor to be deemed the true 
owner. 
A system that is fairer for the true owner must be less fair for the adverse 
possessor.  Nonetheless, while the adverse possessor would be forced to do more 
than just prove the elements of adverse possession, he would not be required to prove 
his ownership.  The rebuttable presumption of chazakah shifts the burden of proof to 
the true owner to disprove the adverse possessor’s ownership.  If, in fact, no 
transaction occurred, the adverse possessor is no worse off than when he was a 
trespasser.  If, however, the true owner fails to prove that a transaction did not occur, 
the adverse possessor is neither better nor worse off than under adverse possession.   
Finally, if chazakah were to replace adverse possession, adverse possession 
would resemble other land transfers.  Unlike a doctrine that allows a transfer simply 
based on the actions of one party, proving the elements of adverse possession in light 
of chazakah proves that a bilateral transaction occurred.  Where adverse possession 
currently leaves us grasping for the other half of the transaction, chazakah provides 
that other half.  Viewing the elements of adverse possession as proof of a transaction, 
assumes a bilateral transfer; it assumes that there was a “seller” or a “donor,” not just 
a trespasser. 
Where adverse possession fails, chazakah thrives.  By taking the elements of 
adverse possession and looking at them not as a means of acquiring ownership, but 
rather as creating a presumption of ownership, chazakah provides an opportunity to 
overhaul a system that is riddled with criticism.  Chazakah takes the benefits of the 
current adverse possession doctrine while simultaneously reducing the areas of 
criticism.  It is a system that values land ownership and the productive use of that 
land.  It does not, however, reward trespassers for being productive users.  Under 
chazakah, Robert Frost’s horseman should, as Frost suggested, continue on his 
journey back to the village.  His nephew will not inherit the forest, the horseman’s 
productivity notwithstanding.  The uncle never had a legitimate claim to the 
property, so the nephew has no claim to the property. 
Though adverse possession would likely reward the nephew for the toil of his 
uncle, chazakah would do no such thing.  Rather than simply looking at the facts on 
the ground, i.e., who is on the property, who has been on the property, and how the 
property has been used, chazakah attempts to get to the truth of the ownership 
dilemma.  It rewards property to rightful owners, those who have bought it, even if 
they cannot prove it, rather than those who look at seemingly unused property as an 
opportunity to enrich themselves, not caring who loses in the process.  The horseman 
had no rightful claim to the forest so his nephew has no claim to the forest.  The 
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children of the man in the village, though, do have a legitimate claim of ownership.  
They are the rightful owners, and chazakah protects them. 
JOSHUA A. KLARFELD179 
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